(Original Signature of Member)
116TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION H.R.
To prevent an unconstitutional war against North Korea.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Khanna introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
A BILL
To prevent an unconstitutional war against North Korea.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This Act may be cited as the "No Unconstitutional
5 War Against North Korea Act of 2020".
6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
7 Congress makes the following findings:
8 (1) The President is currently prohibited from
9 initiating a war or launching a first strike without

1 congressional approval under the United States Con-2 stitution and United States law. 3 (2) The Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, 4 grants Congress the sole power to declare war. 5 (3) George Washington, in a letter to William 6 Moultrie dated August 28, 1793, wrote, "The con-7 stitution vests the power of declaring war in Con-8 gress; therefore no offensive expedition of impor-9 tance can be undertaken until after they shall have 10 deliberated upon the subject and authorized such a 11 measure.". 12 (4) In Examination Number 1 of the Hamilton 13 Papers, dated December 17, 1801, Alexander Ham-14 ilton wrote, "The Congress shall have the power to 15 declare war; the plain meaning of which is, that it 16 is the peculiar and exclusive duty of Congress, when 17 the nation is at peace, to change that state into a 18 state of war.". 19 (5) James Madison wrote, in Madison Papers, 20 Helvidius, Number 4, dated September 14, 1793, 21 "The power to declare war, including the power of 22 judging the causes of war, is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature ... the executive has no 23 24 right, in any case, to decide the question, whether

there is or is not cause for declaring war.".

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1 (6) Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution 2 (50 U.S.C. 1541(c)) states that "the constitutional 3 powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 4 introduce United States Armed Forces into hos-5 tilities, or into situations where imminent involve-6 ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-7 cumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a 8 declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authoriza-9 tion, or (3) a national emergency created by attack 10 upon the United States, its territories or posses-11 sions, or its armed forces". 12 (7) On April 12, 2018, then-Director of the 13 Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Pompeo, testified 14 before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 15 Senate that he believed the President had the au-16 thority to send U.S. military forces into action even 17 if none of the qualifications of section 2(c) of the 18 War Powers Resolution are met. 19 (8) On February 13, 2020, a bipartisan major-20 ity in the Senate directed the President to remove 21 Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran or any 22 part of its government or military, unless otherwise 23 explicitly authorized by Congress, following passage 24 of a similar measure in the House of Representa-25 tives on January 9, 2020.

1	(9) The United States has approximately
2	28,500 members of the Armed Forces stationed in
3	Korea, and over 100,000 United States citizens in
4	total, all of whom would be placed in grave danger
5	if an active military conflict on the Korean Penin-
6	sula were to erupt.
7	SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY
8	STRIKES AGAINST NORTH KOREA.
9	(a) Prohibition of Authorized Military Force
10	IN OR AGAINST NORTH KOREA.—Except as provided in
11	subsection (b), no Federal funds may be obligated or ex-
12	pended for any use of military force in or against North
13	Korea unless Congress has—
14	(1) declared war; or
15	(2) enacted specific statutory authorization for
16	such use of military force after the date of the en-
17	actment of this Act that meets the requirements of
18	the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et
19	seq.).
20	(b) Exception.—The prohibition under subsection
21	(a) shall not apply to a use of military force that is con-
22	sistent with section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution.
23	(c) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this sec-
24	tion may be construed—

1	(1) to prevent the President from using nec-
2	essary and appropriate force to defend United States
3	allies and partners if Congress enacts specific statu-
4	tory authorization for such use of force consistent
5	with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution
6	(50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.);
7	(2) to relieve the executive branch of restric-
8	tions on the use of force, reporting, or consultation
9	requirements set forth in the War Powers Resolution
10	(50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.); or
11	(3) to authorize the use of military force.
12	SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC
13	RESOLUTION TO GROWING TENSIONS WITH
13 14	RESOLUTION TO GROWING TENSIONS WITH NORTH KOREA.
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1	(2) the President, in coordination with United
2	States allies, should explore and pursue every fea-
3	sible opportunity to engage in talks with the Govern-
4	ment of North Korea on concrete steps to reduce
5	tensions and improve communication, and to reinvig-
6	orate high-level negotiations aimed at achieving a
7	diplomatic agreement consistent with the June 12,
8	2018 Joint Statement of President Donald J.
9	Trump of the United States of America and Chair-
10	man Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Re-
11	public of Korea at the Singapore Summit.